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known as the Traction Company, the product.of parallels
and competitors swallowed whole. It owns the city, is
part of the city government, and is stronger than the city
government.
The main point of the corporation problem is that
corporations tend to become stronger than the government
and stronger than the people. Our people have already
one such corporation. Do they want another, which shall
be seated in the eastern half of the State, with its rival
seated in the western half; and, having made the two,
would they like the two to combine into one?
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In the February number of the Harvard Law Review,
CHARLES F. CHAMBERLAYNE has an article, entitled "The
Sugar 1Bounties. '"' It is a careful and able presentation of
the view that the "Sugar Bounty Clause" of the McKinley
Tariff Act is unconstitutional.' The ground taken by the
author is substantially the same as that taken by the
counsel for Sternbach & Co., when the case of that firm
against the Government, which was supposed by Mr.
Chamberlayne to involve the power of Congress to grant
bounties, was before the Court. It is argued that it is
against the nature of a free government to grant bounties
to private persons for entering or laboring in a private
employment.
The case of Sternbach v. United States has now been
decided by the Court,' Mr. Justice HARLAN expressly refuses
to enter on the question of the constitutionality of a
bounty.4 It is difficult, nay almost impossible, to imagine a
1 Harvard Law Rep., Vol. V, p. 320.
2 Act of Oct. I, 1890, C. 1244, Sec. i, Par. 23r, Schedule R.
3 Reported under the name of Field v. Clark, r43 U. S., 649.
4 Page 695.
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case arising, the decision of which would necessarily involve
the constitutionality of a bounty given by the Federal
Government. But we may be sure that sooner or later a
way will be found to legitimately test the correctness of
the position assumed by Mr. Chamberlayne. Then, in
the words of Mr. Justice HARLAN, "It would be difficult to
suggest a question of larger importance, or one the decision
of which would be more far-reaching." To say that the
genins of the institutions of a free people prevents them
stimulating, by bounties, particular industries-something
all national governments have done, and something which,
perhaps, one-half of our people believe to be the correct
economic policy to pursue-is one whose importance de-
mands of every citizen the most careful consideration, and
requires us to go into the fundamental principles of con-
stitutional law.
All our governments are created by written consti-
tutions. The people are sovereign, but government with
us is the creature of the Constitution. No one has placed
the light in which we should regard our constitutions,
whether State or National, better than Mr. Justice BREWER.
He says: "The object of the constitution of a free govern-
ment is to grant, not to withdraw, power. The habit of
regarding the legislature as inherently omnipotent, and
looking at what express restrictions the constitution has
placed upon its action, is dangerous and tends to error.
Rather, regarding, first, those essential truths, those axioms
of civil and political liberty upon which all free govern-
ments are founded; and, secondly, statements of principles
in the Bill of Rights, upon which this governmental struct-
ure is reared, we may then properly inquire what powers
the words of the constitution-the terms of the grant-
convey.'
All power resides in the people, or, as the political
scientists have it, in "the State." Part of this power they
' The State v. Nemaha Co., 7 Kansas, pp. 554, 555. Diss. opinion
of Mr. Justice BREWER. Mr. Justice MILLER, in Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 20
Wall., p. 663, says : "The theory of our governments, State and National,
is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere."
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have delegated to the government created by the constitu-
tion. To interpret the powers granted we need not go
back of the constitution. The numerous dicta which
speak of the unwritten constitution back of the written,
while they indicate a correct point of view, are unfortunate
in the choice of words.1 What is meant is, that the words
of the instrument itself, like the words of any other instru-
ment, should be interpreted in the light of the object which
the people had in view when they adopted it. If, in the
case of a written constitution, the central object is the
establishment of a government of a free people-a repub-
lican government-the fundamental principles of a free
government, the liberty and equality of the citizens is
always the undercurrent of thought, in every line, in every
word. It is in the light, therefore, of the fundamental
principles of human liberty, that we must interpret every
power which has been delegated by the people to the
government.
This principle, we all must admit, is as applicable to
the Federal as to the State governments. The people of
this country never intended to create a despotism. There
are individual rights that are beyond the control of the
government of the United States. Mr. Justice MILLER has
truly said: "A government which recognized no such
rights, which held the lives, the liberty and the property
of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute despotism
'Thus Judge BECK, in his concurring opinion in Hanson v. Vernon,
27 Iowa, p. 73, says: "There is, as it were, back of the written constitu-
tion, an unwritten constitution." Yet, in spite of this unfortunate use
of words, we believe the expression indicates a sounder conception than
that of Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, in his dissenting opinion, in Loan Asso. v.
Topeka, 20 Wall., p. 669, where he says: "Courts cannot nullify an Act
of the State on the vague ground that they think it opposed to a general
latent spirit, supposed to pervade or underlie the constitution, where
neither the terms nor the implications of the instrument disclose any such
restriction." See also the dissent of Judge CoLE, in Hafison v. Vernon,
a7 Iowa, p. 78. No Act of the Legislature can be annulled on vague
ground; but the foundation principles of human liberty are not vague,
and the structure of all our constitutions shows that the powers granted
to government were to be limited by those principles.
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and unlimited control of even the mostdemocratic depository
of power, is after all but a despotism."'
There are, therefore, fundamental rights, which we as
individuals have in common with other citizens of this
free government. Does the Act of Congress, granting a
bounty on the production of sugar, trespass on our rights?
It is contended that it does, in that it appropriates money
for private purposes. If the appropriation of money to pay
sugar bounties is the furtherance of a private purpose, and
not public, there is no doubt but that the bounty is uncon-
stitutional. For if there is one proposition more funda-
mental than another, it is that a free government is estab-
lished for public and not private ends. An Act, whose
primary object is to benefit A, B or C, cannot become law.
To multiply authority or quotation on this head would be
useless.'
The question then is: What is a "public purpose?"
The way in which all the cases, which have involved the
proper construction of the term, have come before the
courts, is where municipalities, under the permission of
State legislatures, have subscribed to the stock, or donated
money to private companies, or granted money to indi-
viduals or firms. In all the cases the courts have universally
recognized the fact that an Act, whose primary object was
the benefit of A or B or C, is nothing more than an attempt
at legislation, futile, because of the want of power granted
by the people to the Legislature.
The courts have universally declared that all ordinances
of city councils, granting aid to manufacturing companies,
or others engaged in private business, are void. Thus,
I Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall, p. 662.
2 "To lay with one hand the power of government on the property ot
the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals, to
aid private enterprise, and build up private fortunes, is none the less a
robbery, because it is done under the forms of law, called 'taxation.'
"No government can tax the whole people for the benefit of a single
individual or an enumerated class of individuals." "By taxation," says
ChiefJustice BLAcK, of Pennsylvania, "is meant a certain mode of raising
revenue for a public purpose, in which the community that pays it has an
interest." Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa., p. 174.
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when the town of Jay, in Maine, under permission of the
legislature, provided that if a certain private company
moved its plant from another town in the State to Jay, the
town would lend $io,ooo to the company, the Supreme
Court of the State held th6 Ordinance void, as the moving
of the company's saw-mill to the town was not, for the in-
habitants of Jay, a public purpose.' The fact that the town
had. been authorized to make the loan by the legislature
was immaterial; the legislature only being able to grant to
the corporation power to pass laws for public purposes per-
taining to the town. The fundamental principle of govern-
ment, that its Acts must be for public purposes and uot for
private gain, as thus applied to loans to particular com-
panies by municipalities, has been made in every State in
the Union, in which the question has arisen, and in the
Supreme Court of the United States.2 Whether the aid
has been attempted through loans or through subscriptions
to stock, the purpose, the aid of particular persons, being
private, the Acts have been declared void.3
That there may be a public advantage in the prosperity
of A, B or C cannot be denied. But, "the promotion of the
interests of individuals, either in respect to property or
business, although it may result incidentally in the advance-
nient of the public welfare, is in its essential character a
private and not a public object. The incidental advan-
tage to the public, or to the State, which results from the
promotion of private interests and the prosperity to private
enterprise or business, does not justify their aid by tlie use
of public money.''4 In fact, the conclusion of every court
IAllen v. Town of Jay, 6o Me., 124.
2 Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N. Y., 91 ; Commercial Bank of
Cleveland v. City of Iola, 2 Dil. C. C. Rep., 353; McConnell v. Hamm,
16 Kansas, 226; Bissel v. City of Kankakee, 64 Ill., 249; English v. The
People, 96 Ill., 566; Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U. S., i.; Parkensburg v.
Brown, lo6 12. S., 487; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 942 ;, Ohio Valley
Iron Works v,. Ioundsville, ii V. Va., r.
3the C. P. & U. P. P. R. Co'. v. Smith, 23 Kansas, 745. See also Minn.
z. Foley, 3o.Minn., 35o.
4 Mr. Justice GRAY, in Lowell Ciiy Z,. Boston, .inl 1ass., p.,46I. It
is not necessary, however, that ,the public service should have been
requested by the government at the time of their performance (Freeland
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and constitutional lawyer may be summarized thus:
" Mon:ey cannot be baid directly or indirectly by govern-
ment to the individual, except in Payment for piublic service,
or to further some fiublic Purpose; and the establishment of
A, B or C in business, or helping A, B or C as individuals
to do anything or be anything, is not and cannot be a public
purpose."
Subscriptions to the stock or bonds, and donations to
railroad companies by the municipalities through which they
pass, have been upheld, wherever declared valid, on the
grounds that though managed by private corporations,
their duties were essentially of a public nature, and their
every act was subject to the control of the State govern-
ment, not only by general laws, but by specific regulations.'
"'The company may be private," says Chief Justice BLACK,
"but the work they are to do is a public duty." 2  The
position taken by those who follow the general trend of
authority on this subject is strikingly put by Judge VALEN-
TINE, in the principal Kansas case. He says: "Suppose
the State should employ an individual to carry stationery
from the depot in North Topeka to the state-house, would
the transportation of such property be any the less a public
purpose because the person so employed might be a private
individual and the wagon and. horses with which he might
transfer the stationery might be private property? And
will it be contended that no taxes could be levied or public
funds used to pay for the service of a postmaster and the
v. Hastings, Io Allen, 570), or that the recipient could have recovered by
a suit against the municipal corporation. It is sufficient that a public
service has been performed. (Town of Guilfort v. Supervisors of Chenango
Co., 13 Ill., 43.) See comments of FOLGER, J.,,on this case, in Weismer
v. Village of Douglass, 64 N. Y., p. 99. On its correctness rests the consti-
tutionality of all pensions paid to soldiers, or the civil employees of
government. See also Blanding* v. Burr, 13 Cala., 343; Creighton v.
Board- of Supervisors, 42 Cala., 446; Lurton v. Ashbury, 41 Cala.-, 526;
but the specific property especially benefited cannot be assessed. See Inl
the matter of Market St., 49 Cala., 546.
' For a list of cases up to i87r, in the various State courts, see Leaven-
worth Co. v. Tiller,-7 Kas., 503-6, per VALEN-TINE, J. See also a partial
list in Hanson- v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, p. 8I, per CoixJ.
2 Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, zi Pa., p. 170.
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use of his house and furniture, or to pay for the service of
said individual, and for the use of his horse and wagon,
simply because the post-office and furniture and horse and
wagon are private property? I"
This seems to be a complete answer to the argument
advanced by Judge DILLON' and by Mr. Justice BREWER,'
and adopted in the Supreme Courts of Iowa,4 Michigan'
and Wisconsin,6 that these Acts aiding railroads, because
they appropriate money to private individuals, are uncon-
stitutional. Granting the business of a railroad to be a
public purpose, the fact that the State hires private indi-
viduals to perform this end is no reason why they should
not be paid by the State. Those who support the validity
of these donations to railroads cannot but regard a rail-
road company.very much in the light of the clerk of a
court, who is paid for the services he renders the public
partly by the fees of suitors. The fact that he has the right
to certain stated fees does not deprive the State of the right
to grant him sums in further payment.
The great difficulty with this view, as applied to rail-
roads, and the reason why such differences of opinion have
been held by eminent jurists, lies in the fact that the rela-
tion of the State to railroad corporations has never been
clearly set forth. It is manifest that if a corporation con-
'Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, per VALENTINE, J., 7 Kas., p. 526.
-In Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28, 53.
3 Dissent in State v. Nemaha Co., 7 Kas., p. 563.
4 Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 28.
r People v. The Township Board of Salem. This case over-ruled.
Swair v. Williams, 2 Mich., 427; 20 Mich., 452.
6 Whitings v. Fond du Lac R. R. Co., 2o Wis., 167. The Supreme
Court of the United States refused to follow this construction of the Con-
stitution of Wisconsin, because it was based on general principles of con-
stitutional law and not on the words of the State Constitution (Olcott v.
The Supervisors, 16 Wall, 678, and Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall, 654, the
Chief Justice, FIELD, MILLER and GIER, J.J., dissenting); thus follow-
ing their own opinion and decision that loans by municipalities to rail-
roads are not loans for a private purpose (R. R. Co. v. Otoe, 16 Wall,
675, the Chief Justice, MILLER and DAvIs, JJ., dissenting). See also St.
Joseph Township v. Rogers, r6 Wall, p. 644. The Supreme Court also re-
fused to follow the Michigan case, see Taylor v. Ypsilanti, zo5 U. S., 6o
New Buffalo v. Iron Co., Ibid., 73. See Pine Grove v. Talcott, ig Wall, 66
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tracted to carry.the mails of the United States, the amount
which it could charge and every detail of management could
be directed by Congress. Such a corporation would be as
completely the servant of Congress as any other employee
of the government. The validity of grants of publid money
to pay such services would never for a moment be ques-
tioned. But under the law, as laid down by the -cases, a
railroad corporation is not the absolute servant of the State,
in the sense that a letter-carrying corporation wouid be of
the United States. A State can make a contract with a
railroad corporation which it cannot break.' It can regu-
late the rates of fare,' but this power is no pwer at all
because the regulation must be reasonable.3  The question,
therefQre, in the case of railroad grants, is whether a State,
.through a municipality, can grant money to a quasi-servant
over the work of which it has but a limited control. This
question, depending as it does on the circumstances of each
case, will never be finally determined. The great weight
of decisions to-day is in favor of the legality of State loans
and payments to railroads; but we are willing to admit that
the ultimate determination of the question will not be until
.the courts declare that railroad companies are solely the ser-
vants of the State. But whichever way that question is
.finally determined, it has manifestly nothing to do with the
question of the legality of the bounties. 4 In the railroad
I Ruggles v. Ill., io8 U. S., 526.
2 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S., 135.
8 Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Minn., I3 U. S.,
418. But this question is again involved in doubt . (See Budd v.- New
York, 143 U. S., 517.)
4 Following the principle that a government of a free people can pay
out money to a quasi-public servant, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that it was within the constitutional power of a State to allow
a municipal corporation to donate its bonds to a grist-mill, because all the
public had a right to grind flour at such mills (Township of Burlington
v. Beasley, 94 U. S., 310). Judge PAINE, in his dissent to the principles
announced by his Court, in Curtis Admr. v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 359, takes
the ground that the aid of such things as education is sufficiently a pub-
lic purpose, to enable the State to make a grant to a definite private school.
But the better opinion seems to be that a gift, by government even to a
private eleemosynary institution, is only valid where the direction of the
charity is under the absolute control of the State, and is open to all the
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cases the courts may have gone to the extreme limit in the
construction of what is payment to individuals for public
service; but it is evident that the payment of money to
anyone.who raises sugar is not a payment for a public ser-
vice, and must be held constitutional, if at all, on lines of
public. (Opinion of Judge DILLoN, in Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 57.
See also The Trustees of Brooks Acad. v. George, 14 W. Va., 411.)
Thus a gift of public moneys to a school building, whose trustees, though
selected by the town, were limited to certain religious denominations,
has been declared unconstitutional (Jenkins v. Andover, io3 Mass., 94).
See also Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis., 350, where the town donating the
money had no control over the trustees of the school, who, at their dis-
cretion, might have excluded all persons of the town from their school:
The principle that the State must have the absolute control over the
works of the company, to enable it to donate money toward the work, was
applied in Coates v. Cambell, 37 Minn., 498. The question for decision
was the right of a town, under legislative permission, to give its bonds
to a corporation for the purpose of aiding the corporation to erect a dam.
The Act was declared unconstitutional, on the ground stated by Chief Jus-
tice GiLILILAN, that the "water-power must belong to some private per-
son or corporation, and the public has no more right or interest in it, or
right in its use, than in any other power owned by a private person or
corporation."
There is oie feature of public aid to railroad corporations and simi-
lar companies, which one can only wonder was ever permitted, and whose
support is rather in the accumulation of authorities than in the accumula-
tion of reasons. Whenever municipal aid to railroads has been permitted
at all, towns have been allowed to lend their aid by subscribing to the
stock .of the corporation. (See, for principal case, Sharpless v. The Mayor
of Philadelphia, 21 Pa., 147.) Permitting a municipal corporation to pay
for cleaning a street, or loan money to a company who would undertake
to clean the streets, is one thing. It is paying in one form or another for
public work; but taking stock and becoming a member of a private cor-
poration, with all the liabilities of a stockholder, is a totally different
thing. It is becoming a partner in a business whose object is the making
of money. Judge REDFIELD, in the 12th Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 5oo, while
he admits the propriety of a municipality taxing itself to aid in the con-
struction of a railroad, says: "But the attempt to do this by allowing the
municipalities to become members of these private companies, must surely
be an anomaly." Whatever may be a public purpose for a municipality,
partnership in private corporations is not included in the list. And yet
it was held, in Sweet'v. Hubert, 15 Bart. (N. Y.), 312, that while under
the decision of the Court of Appeals, in Bank of Rome v. Village of Rome,
IS N. Y., 38, the legislature could authorize a town to subscribe to the
stock of a railroad, it could not authorize a town to donate money to a
railroad. This, as it seems to us, was a complete reversal of legal prin-
ciples.
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reasoning totally distinct from those which uphold such
payments.
It may be perfectly true that a gift of money to A or
B or C is not a public purpose, and that the payment of
money to an individual or corporation for public services
is a public purpose. But when we have said this much we
have not said that the only public purpose conceivable is
the payment of money for public services.
Now, it may be conceded that a law, to be a law at all,
must be, theoretically at least, for the equal benefit of the
whole people. A law which taxed the inhabitants of one
county to pay the debt of a whole State would be uncon-
stitutional, because for the special benefit of the rest of the
counties.' Just as an attempt of the legislature to raise
the public funds from a single individual would be legisla-
tive robbery. 2 We see the recogn.ition of this rule in the
opinion, which is frequently advanced, that a municipality
cannot invest in a railroad corporation, because a railroad
benefiting other portions of the State besides the city, the
city cannot lend its aid to its support." And, in fact, such
legislation can only be supported on the ground that the
town has a special interest in the railroad passing through
it;' just as it has a special interest in and can therefore
donate money to a school house erected in its limits, though
all the people in the State may theoretically have a right
to attend it.'
'Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, C. J. BLACK, 21 Pa., 168.
2Ibid.
8BECK, J., in Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, p. 77. Opinion of Mr.
Binney on the right of Philadelphia to subscribe for the stock of the
Penna. R. R.
4 C. J. BLACK, in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa., 121.
Though one cannotbut think that, however sound the principle, thelearned
Chief Justice expanded its application to its full extent when he sustained
the Ordinances of the Councils of Philadelphia, authorizing the Mayor to
subscribe for the stock of the Hempfield road, whose eastern terminus
was 346 miles west of Philadelphia, simply because the road formed a
link in the system of roads leading to the city.
5 Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen, 5oi. (See also Dorgan v. City of
Boston, 12 Allen, 223.) For the application of the principle that the
special interest in a locality in a general public object is sufficient to en-
able it to carry out that object, see Barrett v. Brook3, 21 Iowa, 144;
Bell v. Foutch, 21 Iowa, 119, where the right of a county to build high-
ways and bridges, to be used by all the people in the State, is sustained.
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But though the people of a town or county cannot be
made, through their State or municipal government, to
alone-support an Act which is practically as beneficial to
other persons outside as to themselves, there is no reason
why all the people in the State should not contribute to a
work which is especially beneficial to a particular locality.
Practically, no act of government is equally beneficial to
each member of the State. To declare that "practical
equality of benefits was the test of public purpose" would
put an end to all legislation. No law was ever intended to be
equally and universally beneficial.' The improvement of
a road-the making of a park-is more beneficial to those
who live in close proximity, than to those who live far off,
and, we might add, the benefit to those who do not use the
road is of the most infinitesimal and remote kind. Laws
granting relief to the poor are only of advantage to those
who are poor. Laws relative to those who own real estate
require a man to own real estate before he can be benefited
by them.
When, therefore, we say that a law must not be for the
benefit of a class, or an individual, but for the whole people,
have we uttered a fundamental principle of free govern-
ment or simply a meaningless phrase? I believe we have
voiced a truth-one that has a very definite and positive
meaning, but not an impossible meaning. It denotes that
one of the criterions of a law being for a public pwrpose is
that every person under the government 'be allowed, if he
fulfilled its conditions, to partake of its benefits.3  An Act
which erected a school-house in the town of X,. and, with-
out providing schools anywhere else in the State, prohibited
any but the children of the inhabitants from attending the
I This is admitted by Air. Chamberlayne, p. 324. See also opinion of
SLA YT oN, A. J., in Norris v. City of Waco, 67 Tex., p. 642.
2 APPrETON, J., in Allen v. Inhabitants ofJay, 60 Me., 140, says: "But
to constitute a public use . . . it is not essential that all portions of the
community should derive equal benefits from the purpose for which
property is taken. It may be taken, though only- portions of the coni-
munity are thereby benefited."
2It may well be doubted whether the distribution of an equal amount
of money to every person is a public purpose. See Hooper v. Emery,
14 Me., 375.
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school, might well be said to be unconstitutional; but Acts
which provide for the erection of a college at the State
capital, though undoubtedly more beneficial to the inhab-
itants of the capital than to those who live in the remote
parts of the State, are hailed as a wise expenditure of public
money for a beneficial public purpose.
The conditions which must be fulfilled before the
benefits of an Act can be enjoyed by an individual, how-
ever, must have some relation to the general public pur-
pose of the Act. To spend public money to pave a highway
is constitutional, though, practically, only ten persons in
the State used the same, but no one would defend an Act
to restrict the highway to people having one hundred
dollars apiece. On the other hand, to confine its use to
wagons would be within the powers of government, because
the condition has some relation to the end in view-the
proper use of the highway. All people who fulfilled the
condition of having wagons could use the highway.
To carry on our investigations a step further: The
grant of a sum of money to B, he being very poor, would
be unquestionably bad. The general purpose of equalizing
the conditions of life may be a public purpose, but the
raising of B, as B, from poverty, is not a public purpose.
Nevertheless, an Act by which the game individual, B,
received the same amount of money, would be constitu-
tiontl, provided that all poor and destitute persons could
receive a like sdim. The law would be a general law,
equally applicable to all citizens who fulfilled the condi-
tions of being destitute, and B had fulfilled that condition.
The point which we learn from this example is this: That
such an object as the relief of the destitute, being a public
purpose, it could be carried out by paying public money to
A, B and C, provided such payments were made under a
general law, equally applicable to those who fulfilled its
conditions. From this we draw four conclusions:
First.-That because A or B or C is destitute, his
raising from distress is not such a public purpose as will
support a direct grant of money for his sole and exclusive
benefit.
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Second.-That the relief of the poor is a public pur-
pose, and, therefore, laws dealing with the poor in general,
or with poverty of certain kinds, are laws for a public pur-
pose.
Third.-That it does not interfere with the constitu-
tionality of the laws that they are practically carried into
effect by paying money to A, B or C.
Fourth.-That one who desires to prove that sugar
bounties are unconstitutional must either prove one of two
things: (I) That the stimulation of a particular industry
by the Federal Government is not a public purpose; or (2)
That, admitting it is a public purpose, it is one of such a
totally different nature from the relief of the destitute, that
there is an innate reason why it cannot be carried out by any
general law, which practically results, as laws for the relief
of the poor, by paying money to A, B or C.
To discuss the last question first: There are three
cases, Lowell v. Boston,' Fieldman & Co. v. City of
Charleston,2 the State v. Osawkee Township,3 in which the
State courts have drawn a distinction between the public
purpose of charity and all other public purposes. The first
two cases arose out of the great fires in Boston and Charles-
ton respectively. The city councils in both passed ordi-
nances loaning the cities' money to any person whose house
was destroyed and who desired to rebuild. The Acts were
declared unconstitutional. Without an intimate knowl-
edge of the facts no one would care to criticise the de-
cisions. Everyone must admit that some laws, which on
their face pretend to be applicable to all persons in certain
conditions, might narrow the conditions to such an extent
as in reality to amount to private legislation. To put an
extreme case: Suppose the law-making body should pass
an Act providing that all persons who had been hurt by the
fire which took place on June I should have their buildings
rebuilt at the expense of the public, and it was known that
A's stable was the only building destroyed on that day.
No one would defend the constitutionality of such an Act
for a moment.
1I 11 ]i Mass., 545. 223 S. C., 57- 1 4 Kas., 418.
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In the Kansas case Mr. Justice BREWER declared un-
constitutional a law of that State which provided that all
persons who were unable to buy seeds for planting, on
account of a recent failure of crops, could obtain seeds on
application to the authorities. The reasoning by which
the conclusions were reached in all these cases, however,
would apply not only to all laws of a similar kind, but to
all laws which attempted to help the persons injured by any
disaster, however frightful, which did not leave them
absolutely destitute. The reasons advanced seem (except
in one instance) to have been put forward without consid-
eration of the point that all persons fulfilling the condi-
tions of the law could receive its benefit, and the fact that
even in a charity an Act appropriating money to specific
individuals would be invalid. The exception is Mr. Jus-
tice GRAY. Speaking of the Boston ordinance, he says:
"The general result may indeed be thus stated collec-
tively, as a single object of attainment; but the fund
raised is intended to be appropriately distributed, by sepa-
rate loans to numerous individuals, each one of which
will be independent of any relation to the others, or to any
general purpose, except that of aiding individual enter-
prise in matters of private business."' Such a method of
dividing up legislation would be fatal to all laws. A
public park is used by A. If we do not consider the
whole purpose of the park, and simply consider his use of
it, the Act establishing the park and laying out the
grounds becomes a private Act for the benefit of A. If
the feature of paying public money to the individual con-
demns the Act, then all relief of the destitute by the State
becomes unconstitutional. Applying the principles recog-
nized in charities to other cases, and we can say, that the
general purpose of a law being a Publiefziri ose for the peo-
ple, whose government passed the law, and if every citizen
who will fulfil its conditions has an equal right to its bene-
fit, the law is not unconstitutional, because it results in
paying money to the individual. We fail to see that there
is any logical difference between the public purpose of
1 Lowell v. Cityof Boston, i ii Mass., 472.
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charity and any other public purpose. And we cannot
but think that empirical distinctions, not based on real
differences, make generally bad and always uncertain prin-
ciples of law. I
The bounty now given on sugar by the Federal Gov-
ernment is paid to individuals; but it is not paid to certain
definite individuals or to a class, but to all persons in the
United States who will grow sugar. It does not'discrimi-
nate between the different parts of the United States. If
I choose to raise sugar under glass in Montana I will re-
ceive the bounty. If, therefore, it is a public purpose for
the United States Government to increase the amount of
production in a particular industry, this law cannot be
otherwise than constitutional.
Mr. Justice BREWER'S opinion, in the State v. Osabekee
Township, sustains the proposition that no government of
a free people-has any interest in its industries to enable it
to stimulate a particular industry. The learned Justice
says: " Cold and harsh as the statement may seem, it is
nevertheless true that the obligation of the State to help is
limited to those who are unable to help themselves."' . . .
Stated baldly, the position of Mr. Justice BREWER is that
no government has any interest in the industries of the
country. Economically this may be a true theory, and
our country may, in the long run, be happier if the State
and National governments raise not so much as a little
finger to stimulate industries, or turn industries from one
channel to another. According to the Manchester school
of economics, this is the best plan for government to
pursue. But it is extraordinary to say that a government of
one of our States has no interest in its industries. Politi-
cally we may advocate a passive policy by a State in respect
I It has been held that a State can grant a bounty to all who produce
salt from waters in the State. See People v. State Auditor, 9 Mich., 327;
East Saginaw Mfg. Co. v. City of East Saginaw, 19 Mich., 259. Though
the fact that the State Court which pronounced these decisions has since
thrown great doubt on them, modifies their importance. See People v.
Township Board of Salem, sup ra.
2 For a clear and forcible statement of his opinion of paternal govern-
ments, see his dissent in Budd v. New York, 143 U. S., p. 443.
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to its industries; but we do so, not because government has
no interest in the industries of the country, but because we
believe it is best for the industries to leave them alone.
It is a common error with our lawyers-but none the
less an error because of its being common-to fasten uncon-
sciously their economic ideas on our constitution. This is
but natural when we consider how firmly imbedded were
certain economic and social theories concerning the advisa-
bility of the non-interference of government in industrial
progress. The proposition that government could, by
statutory law, aid industry and help to'develop the country
is, to many, almost inconceivable. '
But, in spite of our political and economic beliefs, the
real question narrows itself down to this: The stimulation
of a particular industry being conceivably within the
powers of a government of a free people, is it within the
province of our Federal Government, as constituted under
the Constitution? 2
The position taken by Mr. Chamberlayne, in this part
of his argument, is unconsciously singularly inconsistent
with that taken when he speaks of the impossibility of pre-
suming that a free government could pay the public money
for a private purpose. He assumes, what we all must
grant, that if the power to pay sugar bounties is not found
expressly or impliedly in the Constitution, the Federal
Government cannot pay such bounties; but, as we have
pointed out, all constitutions must be regarded in the light
of the subjects, with which they deal. We saw that our
constitutions established governments of a free people, and
judge REDFIELD, in 12 Am. Law Reg., 500, and Judge DILLON, in
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 59. And yet there is no fundamental
reason why it should not be for the advantage of the whole people to
stimulate a particular industry, or why government violates individual
rights in so doing.
2 " And in deciding in any given case, whether the object for which
taxes are assessed, falls upon one side or the other of the line (public pur-
pose), they (the judges) must be governed mainly by the course and usage
of government, the object or purposes which have been considered neces-
sary to the support and for the proper uses of a government, whether
State or National or Municipal." Per Mr. Justice MILLER, in Loan Asso.
v. Topeka, 20 Wall, 664.
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we at once perceived that all their provisions must be read
in the light of the fundamental rules of human freedom.
The Constitution of the United States established the
government of the "nation" of the United States. We
are not only practically a nation, but constitutionally we
have a national government.' All powers adequate for the
proper conduct of a nation, and the furtherance of national
purposes, we must presume to have passed by the Constitu-
tion to the government of the United States.2 Is, then, the
improvement of the industrial conditions of the country,
taken as a whole, a public purpose for a nation? Such a
question has only to be asked to be answered in the affirm-
ative. It may well be argued that the fostering of an
industry, by a particular town of the State, may not be a
public purpose for the government of the town.3 Such a
government stands in the place of the State, with part of
its authority, and a State could not aid the cotton industries
in the town B, and not in the town C.4  Butwhenwe come
to the National Government, the industrial welfare of the
whole people is unquestionably a public purpose. Any
other supposition would be absurd. Recognizing this, we
must further recognize that government can only aid the
industries of the country in one way-by advancing par-
ticular industries. The stimulation resulting from a law
can never be equally distributed. The levees on the Mis-
1 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall, 555.
212 Wall, 556.
s See opinion of APPLETorN, C. J., in Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62
Me., p. 74.
4 To say, however, that a town cannot enter into manufacturing or
other business on its own account, as was said by the members of the
Maine Supreme Court, 58 Me., Appendix, 590; and in Atty.-Gen. v. City
of 3au Claire, 37 Wis., 400, seems nothing more than an attempt by the
judiciary to fasten on our descendants our own opinion as to the advis-
ability of industries being carried on exclusively by private enterprise.
As long as we, as a people, practically hold unanimously to this opinion,
such decisions make very little difference. But should any considerable
number of our people alter their opinions on this subject, such decisions
may lead to what ought to be unnecessary, and, therefore, probably to
harmful changes in our Constitution. See on this head opinion of Judges,
150 Mass., 592.
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sissippi stimulate the growing of cotton more than the
growing of wheat, just as the tariff on cotton goods stimu-
lates their manufacture more than the manufacture of
woolens. If the sugar bounties are unconstitutional, simply
because they stimulate a particular industry, then every
section of the McKinley Bill is unconstitutional.' We
have no sympathy with the position of one who upholds a
protective tariff, because the nominally declared intention
of the Tariff Act is to equalize duties while condemning
bounties. Many an Act of the State legislatures, nominally
to preserve the health of the community, has been declared
unconstitutional, because its evident intention was to regu-
late commerce,2 and we do not see why the courts cannot
apply the same medicine to Congress. If bounty legisla-
tion is unconstitutional, so is a tariff. Now, however
unwise, as an economist, I may possibly consider the pro-
tective tariff, or the bounty system, as a lawyer I must
protest against an attempt to make the Judiciary fasten a
particular economic doctrine on the people of the United
States; especially, when probably the majority of the
people distinctly believe in a different economic policy.
Such a construction of our Constitution would, in the eyes
of the majority, make the Federal Government, as at
present constituted, impotent in the face of great industrial
needs; and, to borrow a thought from a great publicist-
Nothing so surely leads to despotism as the impotency of
government.
' Mr. Chamberlayne's Article, 343.
2 Minnesota v. Barbier, 136 U. S., 313; Bremen v. Rebman, 138
U. S., 78.
